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ARTICLES ]

Partisan Elections: The Albatross of
Pennsylvania's Appellate Judiciary
By Bridget E. Montgomery*

Christopher C. Conner*
An independent Judiciary is a strong Judiciary, a fearless Judiciary,
having respect for its coequal branches of government, but respecting
even more the paramount obligation to the American people in
interpreting the ... law of the land.'

I. Introduction
Proponents of an appointive system for selection of appellate judges
have long maintained that partisan judicial elections spawn candidates
slated on the basis of political affiliation rather than judicial
qualifications, who remain dependent after election upon political party

* J.D. 1989, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable
Sylvia H. Rambo, Chief Judge, United States Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania; Chair,
Subcommittee on Merit Selection, Judicial Selection and Reform Committee, Pennsylvania Bar
Association.
** J.D. 1982, Dickinson School of Law; Shareholder, Mette, Evans, & Woodside, P.C.,
Harrisburg, PA; Chair, Judicial Selection and Reform Committee, Pennsylvania Bar Association.
The authors would like to acknowledge the guidance of the following people, who are among
the leaders of the judicial reform effort in Pennsylvania: The Honorable Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr.,
former President Judge of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and currently chair of Pennsylvanians
for Modem Courts; The Honorable Phyllis W. Beck, Judge of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania;
and Lynn A. Marks, Esquire and Ellen Kaplan, Esquire, of Pennsylvanians For Modem Courts. The
authors also thank David M. Chuprinski, Governmental Affairs Director, Pennsylvania Bar
Association, for research assistance, and Barry L. Kauffman, Executive Director, Common Cause of
Pennsylvania, for permitting access to his research files. The authors, of course, take full
responsibility for any errors or omissions in this article and for the viewpoints expressed herein.
1. Honorable Alexander Wiley, The Meaning of an Independent Judiciary,7 F.R.D. 553, 556
(1947).
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affiliations for the continuation of their positions.2 By now, it should be
conventional wisdom that these weaknesses are inherent and incurable in
elected judiciaries.
Nevertheless, since 1850, the Pennsylvania
Constitution has provided that state judges shall ascend to the bench
through the partisan election process.' Pennsylvanians are now poised
to change this discredited system to the appointive process commonly
known as merit selection:
a system that utilizes a nominating
commission to screen judicial applicants and to prepare a list of qualified
nominees for the governor, who must appoint from that list, subject to
senate approval.
With embarrassingly lavish judicial election campaigns, marked voter
apathy, and the public troubles of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as a
backdrop,4 the call for merit selection has once again gained momentum
in Pennsylvania. Merit selection legislation is now pending in the state
House and Senate,5 the first step in the process of obtaining the
constitutional amendment needed to establish merit selection.
Pennsylvanians should seize this opportunity 6 to abolish costly judicial
elections and establish merit selection of judges, thus ensuring themselves
the benefit of a learned and independent judiciary worthy of the public
trust.
II. Judicial Selection Trends in the American States
From the time of the struggle for independence in the original
thirteen colonies, Americans have pondered the question of how best to
select judges in a democratic society. The history of judicial selection
methods in the states chronicles the evolution of American thinking on

2.

See, e.g., 1959 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 37 (comments

to majority recommendation for institution of merit selection plan). For a discussion of efforts to
institute merit selection of judges in Pennsylvania, see infra, Section II.
3. PA. CONST. art. V § 13(a). The provision creates an exception for mid-term judicial
vacancies to be filled by temporary appointment by the governor. Judicial elections were instituted
through an 1850 amendment to the Constitution of 1838. See ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 575 (1985).
4. See infra, Part II, for a discussion of these issues.
5. See H.B. 2, Printer's No. 12 (Pa. 1993); S.B. 340, Printer's No. 1436 (Pa. 1993).
6. Amendment to the state Constitution through legislative proposal and ballot referendum
requires majority passage of the amending legislation twice in each chamber of the General
Assembly, suitable publication, placement of the proposed amendment on the popular ballot, and
majority approval by the voting electorate. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Should the current proposal fail
to gain majority approval on the ballot, a merit selection proposal may not be considered again for
at least five years. ld.
7. See generally, THE COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY, JUDIcIA. SELECnON GOVERNANCE STUDY
10-11 (1983) [hereinafter, COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY]; MORTON J. HORWrmZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW 4-12 (1983).
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this issue, as in each successive era, prevailing concerns about the role of
the judiciary provoked changes in methods of judicial selection. 8 The
solution never promised to be an easy one, requiring harmonization of
two competing interests: the independence of the judiciary from the
executive and legislative branches of government, and some measure of
judicial accountability to the public who will be affected by judicial
behavior. 9 The drafters of the United States Constitution brought to this
dilemma a strong desire to protect against a judiciary that functioned at
the will of a dominant ruler, as it had in England. The idea of an elected
judiciary was never seriously entertained. The founders wisely settled
upon an independent appointed judiciary designed to balance rather than
parallel the elected branches of government; the legislative and executive
branches of government were designed to be accountable to the public,
while the judiciary was to be accountable to the law.' °
The central principle underlying the federal judiciary plan - "that
the complete independence of the courts of justice is essential in a limited
constitution" t" - actually was implemented first by the early states in
their judicial appointment schemes.' 2 The notion of a popularly elected
judiciary was as unthinkable to the emerging states as the notion of
vesting judicial appointment power in one sovereign entity. 3 Indeed,
the original thirteen states chose substantially similar methods of judicial
selection: each established a tenured appointed judiciary, vesting
8.

See COMMITEE OF SEVENTY, supra note 7, at 9-10.

9.

HARRY P. STumnPF & JOHN H. CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 37-38 (1992).

10. See generally SARI S. Escovrrz, FRED KURLAND & NAN GOLD, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE 3-4 (1975). That popular election of judges would defeat the balance envisioned in the
separation of powers scheme was expressed in the Federalist papers:
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different
powers of government ... each department should have a will of its own; and

consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little
agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle
rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme
executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain
of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one
another .... Some deviations ... from the principle must be admitted.

In the

constitution of the judiciary department in particular ... first, because peculiar
qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to
select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the
permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon
destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (1788) (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
12. The establishment of the original state judiciaries predated that of the federal judiciary,
which came into being in 1789 as a result of the Federal Judiciary Act. ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 3-4, 224-28 (Maeva Marcus ed. 1992).
13. See generally Escovrrz ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
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appointment power in either the state legislature or in the governor at the
advice and consent of the legislature or a special committee.' 4 These
judicial selection schemes furthered the colonial resolve to prevent against
consolidation of power in a ruling entity; by involving the legislature or
a special committee in the appointment process, the early states withheld
from the executive branch exclusive control over judicial appointments,
thereby protecting judicial independence and fostering the desired balance
in democratic government. 15
Notwithstanding early American commitment to judicial
independence, it was always tempered by a pervasive fear of judicial
discretion and its inevitable result, judicial lawmaking. 16 By the turn of
the nineteenth century, this fear had become exacerbated by the foremost
legal development of the era: the transformation from the view of the
common law as a fixed body of rules to the view of it as an instrument
of the people's will by which new law could be made. 17 During the
same period, Marbury vs. Madison'8 introduced the concept of the
power of the courts to review and to invalidate popularly enacted
legislation. With these legal developments, the judiciary stood poised for
the first time to exercise power to effect social change.' 9 Theoretical
concern about the power of judicial review without accountability to the
public was coupled with a practical concern - the tendency of state
legislatures to confer judicial appointments upon political supporters.20
In this atmosphere of change, dissatisfaction with the notion of a tenured,
appointed judiciary, particularly one occupied by privileged landowners,
took root.2' Clearly, the intent to establish an independent judiciary as

14. In eight of the original thirteen states, judges were appointed by one or both branches of
the state legislature. Five chose an appointment process involving the state governor and a popularly
elected council. EscoVrrz ET AL., supra note 10, at 4. Pennsylvania was unique in that it chose not
to elect a governor in the early years of its statehood but was governed, instead, by a twelve-member
elected executive council. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19. It was this council that appointed the judiciary
until 1790, when the state Constitution was amended to provide for an elected governor who would
appoint the judiciary. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 8.
15. See COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY, supra note 7, at 10; LARRY BERKSON, SCOTT BELLER,
MICHELE GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS

3 (1981). The states' regard for the independence of their judiciaries is further demonstrated by their
opposition to federal court supremacy and their insistence that the 1789 Federal Judiciary Act include
a clause limiting federal review of state court decisions. See ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
supra note 12, at 3-4, 224-28.
16. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 4-9, 12.
17. See generally id. at 1-30.
18. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. HOROWITZ, supra note 7, at 30.
20. See COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY, supra note 7, at 10-11.
21. BERKSON Er AL., supra note 15, at 3.
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a balance to the other branches of government was being thwarted by the
selection schemes in place in the early American states.
By 1820, a number of states had attempted to remedy these
weaknesses by instituting limited tenure for judges. 22 Mississippi
experimented with election of judges in 182123 and in 1832 became the
first state to elect all judges.2 4 It was not until the populist sweep of the
Jacksonian era in the mid-nineteenth century, however, and its
accompanying call for democratic elections on every front, that other
states moved towards the popular election of state judges.' In 1846,
New York became the second state to institute a popularly elected
judiciary 2 6 by the Civil War era, twenty-four of the existing thirty-four
states had instituted popular election of judges.27
For the debate over
how best to select judges, the notable point about the shift to election of
judges in the nineteenth century is this: it was not a thoughtful response
to concerns over the independence or integrity of the judiciary. Rather,
the shift to judicial elections was more than anything a response to the
populist fervor that inundated the nation at the time, effecting all of its
institutions.28 If elections were designed to relieve the judiciary of
special interests, the relief was evanescent. 29 Elected judiciaries quickly
fell under the control of the powerful and decidedly undemocratic
political machines that dominated large cities such as Chicago and New
31
York. 30 Judges came to be viewed as corrupt and incompetent.
Thus, even in its incipient stages, flaws in the partisan election of judges
came to light.
By the turn of the century, problems with the states' elected
judiciaries had become the focus of a national reform movement. The
American Bar Association was committed to the reform movement, and

22.
23.
24.

ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 144-46 (1975).
Id. at 145.
STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 9, at 38; ALLAN A. ASHMAN & JAMES 1. ALFINI, THE KEY
TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 9 (1974).
25. STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 9, at 38; Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges-An
Historical Perspective, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (1966).
26. COVER, supra note 22, at 146; ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 24, at 9.
27. ESCOVrrZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 6.
28. STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 9 at 38. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 56-85 (2d ed. 1973) (explaining, inter alia, the organizing of the
working class against the privileged property owners and the national banks).
29. BERKSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
30. See Winters, supra note 25, at 1083 (discussing the control over the judiciary of the
Tammany Hall organization in New York City in the 1860's); JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 132 (1950) (discussing the impact of Chicago's political
machines on the judiciary).
31. BERKSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
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influential public figures, notably ex-President (and future Supreme Court
Justice) William Howard Taft and the legal scholar Roscoe Pound,
worked to spread their view that elected judges posed a profound threat
to the integrity of the judiciary.3 2 In this atmosphere of reform, the
American Judicature Society (AJS) was created in 1913, led by Albert M.
Kales as its "director of drafting. 33 Judicial selection reform was a
primary goal of the AJS, and Kales immediately undertook the task of
devising a workable method for the appointive selection of judges.34
The ultimate product of Kales' efforts was his proposal for a commission
plan that would feature a panel of presiding judges, which would submit
to an elected chief justice a list of nominees chosen on the basis of merit.
Judges would be selected from that list by the chief justice, and
noncompetitive retention elections would be held after a period of
time.35 With the Kales plan as a starting point, later reformers proposed
a three-member advisory committee comprised of the state supreme court
justice, the attorney general, and the president of the state bar association,
with appointment by the governor rather than the chief justice.36 In
1931 two separate sources suggested for the first time that members of
the lay community serve on the nominating commission with members
of the bar and the judiciary. 37 The American Bar Association continued
its support of judicial selection reform; with the encouragement of its
judicial reform committee, and a statewide Missouri citizen's committee,

32. See Winters, supra note 25, at 1083; Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of The 50th
Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74 JUDICATuRE 128-29 (Oct.Nov. 1990). In 1913, Taft warned the
American Bar Association that non-partisan judicial elections would not cure the ills of the elective
process, because aggressive campaigning allowed unqualified candidates without political support to
be elected.
Pound gave a portentous and frequently cited speech, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, reprinted in J. OF AM. JUD., 177 (Feb. 1937), at the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association in St. Paul, Minnesota in 1906. Pound identified numerous
problems - from outmoded concepts of legal doctrines and philosophy to outmoded schemes of
courts and procedure - which gave rise to "more than the normal dissatisfaction with the present-day
administration of justice in America." Id. at 183-85. Pound's speech is quoted most often, however,
for his castigation of judicial elections, which, he urged, by "[plutting courts into politics and
compelling judges to become politicians... [had] almost destroyed the traditional respect for the
bench." Id. at 18.
33. A professor at the Northwestern University School of Law, Kales is recognized as one of
the leaders of his day in legal and judicial reform efforts. See Krivosha, supra note 32, at 129.
34.

Id. at 129; ALBERT M. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 225-51

(1914).
35.

COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY, supra note 7, at 18.

36.
37.

BERKSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 5.
See Krivosha, supra note 32, at 130.

PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECIONS

in 1937 Missouri became the first state to adopt a commission-based
system of merit selection.38
Over the last fifty years, states across the country have moved
increasingly toward a merit selection scheme for some or all of their
judges. Although no two states have implemented precisely the same
plan, each contains at least four components which are drawn from
Missouri's original merit selection scheme:
(1) a permanent nonpartisan nominating commission
composed of legal professionals and lay citizens who have
been appointed by a variety of public and private
individuals or groups;
(2) the nomination by the commission of possible judicial
candidates on the basis of qualifications and experience;
(3)

the selection of judges from the
commission's list of nominees; and

nominating

(4) the requirement that appointed judges submit to
noncompetitive, nonpartisan retention elections at the
end of an established term.39
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia now use some form of
a nominating commission plan for the initial selection of at least some of
their judges.40 Pennsylvania, unfortunately, is one of only eight states
that continues to elect all of its judges in partisan elections."

38. Id. Missouri's citizens reportedly were motivated by their outrage over a particularly ruthless
and successful political campaign, waged by a scarcely qualified opponent against one of Missouri's
most respected jurists after several of his decisions offended the political party leaders who helped
put him into office. id at 132.
39. BERKSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 6.
40. Initial selection is defined as the method by which judges are selected for a full term of
office. As of 1992, the following states had a form of merit selection plan, or "Missouri Plan," as
they have come to be known, for initial selection and mid-term vacancies for at least some of their
courts: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. Another eleven states provide
for merit-based appointments for mid-term vacancies. States Using Merit Selection, Tables 11-12
(August 1992) (unpublished document of the American Judicature Society, on file with the Dickinson
Law Review).
41. In Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois. Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West
Virginia, initial judicial selections are made by partisan elections. In these jurisdictions, mid-term
vacancies may be filled, as in Pennsylvania by temporary appointment pending the next suitable
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III. Judicial Selection in Pennsylvania
The drafters of Pennsylvania's first constitution shared the colonial
fear of entrenched power, choosing to vest the appointment power of the
judiciary in a council composed of representatives of the counties then
existing in Pennsylvania.42 The historical factors explaining the shift to
election of judges in Pennsylvania are much the same as those explaining
the trend elsewhere in the United States. As in the rest of the country,
abuses of the appointive process combined with the sweep of populist
sentiment to create dissatisfaction with the appointed judiciary. The
election of Pennsylvania's judges began in 1850, as a result of an
amendment to the Constitution of 1838.43
Since that time,
Pennsylvanians have continuously elected all state judges, except for
those appointed to fill vacancies."
Pennsylvania's elective system led, predictably, to the success of
candidates based upon the strength of their political party rather than on
their judicial qualifications. Recognizing the influence of party affiliation
on judicial elections, Pennsylvanians sought to introduce merit into the
process by instituting non-partisan elections for appellate judges in 1913.
Under this system, candidates were precluded from revealing their party
affiliations on the ballots or in their campaigns." The system proved
ineffectual, however, in part because political leaders continued to control
the slating of many candidates while the ballots became clogged with
numerous unknown judicial hopefuls. The confusion generated by these
conditions led to the repeal of the non-partisan elective system in
1921.46
Official efforts to institute merit selection akin to the Missouri plan
began in earnest in 1957, when the General Assembly created a
Commission on Constitutional Revision. 47 The Commission's charge

election opportunity. See Judicial Selection in the States, Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts,
Summary of Initial Selection Methods (Jan. 1992 update) (unpublished document of the American
Judicature Society, on file with the Dickinson Law Review).
42. COMMrIEE OF SEVENTY, supra note 7, at 10; WOODSIDE, supra note 3, at 567-71.
43. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. V; WOODSIDE, supra note 3.
44. PA. CONST. art. V § 13(b). Beginning with Governor Scranton in 1964, Pennsylvania
governors have utilized a form of nominating commission to assist in the selection of candidates for
judicial vacancies. COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY, supra note 7. at 19; REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
JuDIcIAL REFORM COMMISSION 207 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter BECK COMMISSION REPORT] (dissenting
Report on Judicial Selection and Retention). Even judges who are appointed to fill vacancies,
however, must face political election after a limited term. PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(b).
45. Act of July 24, 1913, No. 457, 1913 PA. LAWS 1001 (repealed 1921); COMMITTEE OF
SEVENTY, supra note 7, at 18.

46. COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY, supra note 7, at 18.
47. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 2, at 4.
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was to study court reform and, in particular, constitutional revisions to the
Judiciary Article." The majority report of the Woodside Commission,
as it was known, 49 concluded that:
[P]oliticians, rather than the people, select the nominee for judicial
office under this [elective] procedure and the selection is determined
... on the basis of extra-judicial considerations, such as party
affiliation.. .and patronage considerations... [Riequiring the judge
to submit himself periodically on a party ballot to the public[,] tends
to produce a dependent judiciary in that he must appeal for support
from those who are likely to have cases before him and he must keep
friendly with party bosses... Further, the tenure of an elected judge
is often tied to the fortunes of his political party and he may be
retained in office, or rejected, depending upon the views of the
electorate respecting issues [which] are usually totally irrelevant to the
issue of his fitness to serve as a judge."
The Woodside Commission devised and recommended a plan it termed
the "Pennsylvania Plan," which was very similar to the Missouri merit
selection plan. 5 Although the work of the Woodside Commission did
not result in judicial election reform, it provoked intense interest in merit
selection that continues to this day.
In 1963, a new Governor's Commission on Constitutional Revision
was formed to examine numerous constitutional issues.52 The 1963
Commission again recommended the adoption of merit selection but the
issue was deferred until Pennsylvania's Constitutional Convention of
1968, where judicial election reform again was a major issue. Ultimately,
the Convention's Judiciary Committee recommended adoption of the
Missouri merit selection plan for essentially the same reasons cited by the
Debate over the issue was strenuous,
Woodside Commission.53
however; opponents made the most of the "right to vote" issue.'
Unable to agree, the delegates finally decided to include only retention
elections in the constitutional amendment, and to submit the merit
selection question separately at the 1969 primary election, which would

48. The Judiciary Article is article five of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
49. Honorable Robert E. Woodside, then Judge of the Superior Court, was the chair of the
Commission. The majority report was submitted by eight of the fifteen commissioners. Interestingly,
Judge Woodside joined in the minority report, which favored the status quo of an elected judiciary.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTION REVISION, supra note 2.

50. l at 37.
51. d.
52. CommrrrEE OF SEVENTY, supra note 7, at 19.
53. See id at 19-20.
54. Id. at 20.
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follow the new constitution's ratification election.55 The merit selection
proposal lost by a narrow margin in the 1969 primary due to the
opposition of powerful political party leaders.5 6
The most recent merit selection initiative gained impetus from
Governor Robert P. Casey's July 16, 1987 executive order establishing
the Pennsylvania Judicial Reform Commission, known as the Beck
Commission, to consider and recommend judicial reforms. 57 The Beck
Commission held public hearings and consulted with numerous experts
in the field of the judiciary, with the goal to "find a method of judicial
selection that will minimize partisan and special interest influence and
best provide for Pennsylvania an impartial and competent judiciary. 5 8
The Beck Commission identified three fundamental problems with
judicial elections. First, the Commission found that few voters made
informed decisions about state-wide judicial candidates and that, lacking
community familiarity with candidates, election results depended upon
factors extraneous to judicial qualifications, such as ballot position, name
recognition, campaign expenditures, party endorsement, and geography.59
Second, the Commission believed that the elective system was wholly
inconsistent with the decision-making function of appellate courts and the
courts' role as the "check" on the legislative and executive branches and
the trial courts. In the Commission's view:
An electoral process ...simply cannot adequately insure that the
judges will have that ultimate independence and faithfulness to the
law that is of the utmost importance. While an electoral process in
a small county trial court election may well succeed in obtaining
judges that the voters have determined to be fundamentally good and
honest people with a true dedication to justice, a statewide electoral
process is necessarily too politically charged, too dependent upon the
support of political parties and special groups and too devoid of
relevant information to permit the achievement of this goal. 60

55. 1968 PA. LAWS vol. II, Proposal No. 7 of the Constitutional Convention of Pennsylvania,
1968 Session.
56.

BECK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 144-45.

57. See Executive Order No. 1987-14, reprintedin BECK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44,
at 1. The Honorable Phyllis W. Beck, Judge of the Superior Court, chaired the Commission. In
addition to judicial elections issues, the Beck Commission considered a wide variety of other judicial
problems, including the growth of litigation generally, the increase in specialized litigation, the
growth of interest groups, the need for advanced technological and administrative expertise in
administering the judicial system, and the need to allocate public resources equitably. See id.
58. Id. at 148.
59. Id. at 150-51.
60. lt at 153.
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The Commission found that the political atmosphere of the electoral
process created at least the appearance of ethical impropriety by tying the
loyalty of elected judges to those who assisted their campaigns with either
political or financial support.6 1 Finally, the Commission found that the
rigors and politics of elections tended to prevent diversification on the
bench in terms of gender, race, and geographical origin.62
The Beck Commission recommended adoption of a merit selection
plan that, like the Missouri Plan, would include a permanent commission
to nominate potential judicial appointees and the appointment of judges
by the governor from that list. To accommodate concern for electoral
input, the Beck Commission recommended non-partisan retention
elections be required four years after initial appointment to the appellate
court.6 3 The Commission advised that elections worked reasonably well
in small counties, where the relatively small number of voters and local
nature of the elections permitted an informed choice with respect to the
qualifications and character of judicial candidates. 64 It expressed
reservations about the meaningfulness of such elections in larger counties,
but recommended that the issue be left to the voters in each county.65
The Beck Commission's recommendations for merit selection were
incorporated into two virtually identical bills that were introduced in the
House and Senate in the 1989-90 session of the Pennsylvania General'
Assembly. Senate Bill 594" passed the Senate by a vote of 26 to 22.
The bill was referred to the House State Government Bills Committee,
where it remained at the end of the 1990 session. 67 House Bill 9416
was defeated in the House of Representatives on final passage on June
11, 1990 by a vote of 101-92. 69 Thus, by a slight margin, Pennsylvania
voters again were denied an opportunity to choose merit selection.
Despite the 1990 defeat, the effort to achieve merit selection has
retained its vitality. Sadly, the endurance of the merit selection issue is
attributable, in part, to a number of well-publicized scandals within the
Pennsylvania judiciary. A few examples will suffice. In 1988, following
a long investigation and trial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court removed

61. BECK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 152-53.
62. Id at 153-54.
63. Id.at 155-56.
64. I/ at 149.
65. ld.
66. See S.B. 594, Printer's No. 1779 (Pa. 1989).
67. History of Senate Bills, Resolutions and Executive Communications in the Senate, Sessions
of 1989-90, A-69.
68. See H.B. 941, Printer's No. 2510 (Pa. 1989).
69. History of House Bills and Resolutions, Sessions of 1989-90, A-144.
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from the bench seven judges of the Philadelphia County Court of
Common Pleas, and one Municipal Court judge, after each was
determined to have taken bribes in the form of "Christmas presents" from
a roofers' union.7 ° In 1989, a former Cambria County Court of
Common Pleas judge was convicted of numerous criminal offenses,
including official oppression, bribery, and criminal coercion. Following
the state Supreme Court's rejection of his final appeal," the former
judge reportedly fled the country to avoid imprisonment.72
Even more distressing than these cases involving judges of the courts
of common pleas is the long-standing turmoil on the state Supreme Court.
In October, 1992, after an investigation and hearings that spanned five
years and engendered substantial publicity, the state Supreme Court
upheld the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board's 73 recommendation that
Justice Rolf Larsen be publicly reprimanded for conferring with a lower
court judge about the status of a case before her.74 A feud ensued
between Larsen and the two Justices who voted to uphold his reprimand,
Justices Ralph J. Cappy and Stephen A. Zappala. In petitions filed before
the state Supreme Court in November and December, 1992, Justice
Larsen demanded that Justices Cappy and Zappala be disqualified or
recuse themselves from participating in the reconsideration of his
reprimand, and made numerous allegations of unethical and criminal
conduct by the two Justices, and unethical conduct by Chief Justice
Robert N.C. Nix, Jr.75
Justice Larsen's accusations led to the

70. See In the Matter of Cunningham, et al., 538 A.2d 473 (Pa. 1988). Many other judges were
indicted and subjected to formal proceedings before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board as a result
of the same grand jury investigation that led to the Cunningham convictions. Although other judges
were found to have taken money from the roofers' union as well, for various reasons the Supreme
Court refused the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board's recommendation of sanctions against certain
judges, finding that they had not violated the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See, e.g., In
the Matter of Braig, 554 A.2d 493 (Pa. 1989); In the Matter of Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202 (Pa. 1989).
Despite the dismissal of some of the formal charges, the appearance of impropriety remained in the
public mind.
71. See Commonwealth v. O'Kicki, 597 A.2d 152 (Pa. Super. 1991) (upholding convictions),
alloc denied, 662 A.2d 1156 (Pa. 1993).
72. See Linda Hudkins, Where's O'Kicki, ALTOONA MIRROR, March 4, 1993, at 2-A.
73. Until the recent amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution's judicial discipline
provisions, see infra note 77 and accompanying text, the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board was
responsible for investigating allegations of judicial misconduct.
74. See In the Matter of Larsen, 616 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992).
75. Justice Larsen accused Justice Zappala of taking "indirect kickbacks," and claimed that
Justices Zappala and Cappy, inter alia, illegally recorded face-to-face conversations and conspired
to seize control of the court. Justice Larsen alleged that Chief Justice Nix improperly intervened in
a murder prosecution before a judge of the court of common pleas. See In the Matter of Honorable
Rolf Larsen, Justice, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, No. 155 JIRB Docket 1992 (Petition for
Disqualification and Recusal of Justice Stephen A. Zappala and Justice Ralph J. Cappy, filed in the
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appointment of a special investigative grand jury to ascertain the truth of
the charges.76 Whether or not this investigation leads to removal of one
or more justices is less important than what has occurred to date; the
lasting significance of this public debacle lies in its profound damage to
the public trust in Pennsylvania's judiciary.
The publicity surrounding the recent court scandals provided
substantial impetus for reform of the judicial discipline system in
Pennsylvania. On May 18, 1993, voters approved amendments to the
state Constitution to improve the method through which judges are
investigated and disciplined for misconduct in office.77
The General Assembly responded to this mandate for reform by
introducing merit selection legislation in the House and in the Senate.7 8
In its original form, Senate Bill 34071 proposed to amend the state
Constitution to abolish popular election of all appellate judges and to
establish in its place an appointive process that would include a judicial
nominating commission, gubernatorial appointment, majority Senate
approval of the governor's appointees, and retention elections. 8° Thus,
the plan embodied in Senate Bill 340 contained the conventional
provisions of the Missouri merit selection plan. The bill required that
qualifications be the first consideration in selecting nominees; in addition,
the original bill contained a strong diversity provision, which required the
nominating commission to consider that appellate courts should include
men and women, as well as people from racially, ethnically, and

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, November 24, 1992); In the Matter of Honorable Rolf Larsen, Justice,
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, No. 155 JIRB Docket 1992 (Supplemental Petition for Disqualification
and Recusal of Justice Stephen A. Zappala and Justice Ralph J. Cappy) (filed in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, December 15, 1992).
76. See, e.g., Justice Reportedly Asks End To Probe, HARRISBURG PATRIOT NEwS, Aug. 28,
1993, B-1; Tim Reeves, GrandJury and Larsen Becoming Adversaries, HARRISBURG PATRIOT NEWS,
Aug. 27, 1993, at A-1.
77. The constitutional amendment, which was placed on the ballot as Joint Resolution 1993-1
in the May, 1993 primaries, adopted the discipline scheme set forth in Senate Bill 1000 of 1991-92,
Printer's No. 2413 (implementing legislation enacted into law by Act 1993-56, P.L. _, effective
August 16, 1993). The discipline amendment altered the manner in which judges are investigated
and disciplined in the Commonwealth by. inter alia, abolishing the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board, vesting responsibility for the investigative and adjudicative aspects judicial discipline
procedures in two separate entities, making the adjudicative function public, and diminishing the
control of the Supreme Court over the process. See also Support Judicial Reform, YORK DISPATCH,
May 16, 1993, at 8-F.
78. On February 1, 1993, Senate Bill 340 of 1993 was introduced, with Senator Michael Bortner
as its prime sponsor. House Bill 2 of 1993 was introduced by Representatives Dwight Evans and
Jeffrey Piccola on January 26, 1993. Presumably through agreement between the two chambers, the
focus has been on Senate Bill 340.
79. S.B. 340, Printer's No. 356 (Pa. 1993).
80. Id. at §§ 8, 13-14.
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geographically diverse origins. 8 To further ensure the diversification
of the appellate bench, the bill required that the nominating commission
also reflect such diversity and that it include represent members of the
labor, business, and civic communities. 2 No more than half of the
nominating commissioners were to be from the same political party and
no more than half were to be members of the bar."a Finally, the original
Senate Bill 340 contained an effective "anti-gridlock provision," which
permitted the governor to make an appointment without the consent of
the Senate upon its rejection of three nominees for any vacancy."
Senate Bill 340 was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee
as amended on June 8, 1993, given second consideration on June 15,
19935 by the full Senate, and sent to the Senate Rules and Executive
Nomination Committee on June 23, 1993.8 Although the essential four
features of a merit selection plan remain intact,87 the amendments
removed the mandate for diversity considerations with respect to judicial
nominees, and softened the language with respect to diversity in the
composition of the nominating commission.88 In addition, the antigridlock provisions included in the original bill were removed, while the
requirement for Senate approval of the governor's nominee was changed
from simple majority to two-thirds majority.8 9 Finally, the amended bill
contains a new provision allowing the public in each county to vote on
whether or not to introduce merit selection for the election of judges of
the courts of common pleas.' °
Whether the General Assembly will vote on Senate Bill 340 in its
current form remains to be seen. The General Assembly would be wise
81. S.B. 340, Printer's No. 356, § 14(h) (Pa. 1993). Currently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
is composed of six Caucasian men, and one African-American man, all of whom are from either
Allegheny or Philadelphia county. The Superior Court is currently composed of twelve men and two
women; thirteen judges are Caucasian and one judge is African-American. The Commonwealth
Court contains six men and three women. Eight judges are Caucasian and one is African-American
(these figures do not include senior judges).
82.

Id at § 14(b).

83. Id.
84. Id at § 13(a).
85. The Pennsylvania Constitution requires that a bill receive consideration on three different
days. PA. CONST. art. III, § 4.
86. See Combined History of Senate and House Bills, Thursday, Sept. 16, 1993, No. 8, A-34.
87. See infra notes 39 and 76 and accompanying text.
88. The amended bill states: "The Commission should include a representation of men and
women and should reflect the geographical, political, economic and ethnic diversity of the
Commonwealth." S.B. 340, Printer's No. 1436, § 14(A) (Pa. 1993).
89. Id. at § 13(A).
90. In its original form, Senate Bill 340 left intact the elective process for Pennsylvania's Court
of Common Pleas judges. The new provision, known as a "local option" provision, permits counties
to adopt merit selection for those judges as well. See id. at § 14(l).
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to reinstate the anti-gridlock provision to lessen the potential impact of
political in-fighting during Senate confirmation. Further amendments also
should restore the strong diversity provisions of the original bill, as they
provided greater assurance that merit selection will respond to the need
for diversification of the appellate bench. With the reinstatement of
these important provisions, Senate Bill 340 would offer a merit selection
plan devised to provide Pennsylvanians with a sound and much-needed
alternative to judicial elections.
IV. The Merits of Merit Selection
The benefits of merit selection lie within its intrinsic positive
characteristics, and within its potential to eliminate problems inherent in
judicial elections. By placing the nominating power in a bi-partisan
commission and making continued tenure of judges dependent upon nonpartisan retention elections, merit selection offers a system by which
judges can apply the law more or less unfettered by the political tensions
that drive the executive and legislative branches of the government. In
this environment, the judiciary can fulfill its intended function as the
independent, impartial branch of a democratic government.
There is a tendency to perceive judicial misconduct as the primary
impetus for a move to merit selection of judges. 91 Although undeniably
serious and disturbing, judicial misconduct is not the primary rationale for
merit selection. Discipline problems involve only a small proportion of
Pennsylvania's judiciary,' and they are not as significant as the
enduring perils of partisan judicial elections:
the tendency to
deemphasize judicial temperament and qualifications, and to emphasize
partisan political affiliations at the real or apparent expense of the
independence of the judiciary.
Indeed, safeguarding the independence of the judiciary is a major
benefit of merit selection. Candidates for judge would no longer face the
constraints of an initial election campaign. Not the least of these
91. See, e.g., State's Biggest Joke, DELAWARE Co. TiMEs, Jan. 31, 1993, at A-24.
92. There are approximately three hundred and eighty-two state judgeships in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, not including those within the special courts (e.g., district justice
courts, Philadelphia Traffic Court and Municipal Courts) or seniorjudgehips. See The PA. MANUAL,
§ 5 (Dec. 1991). This number includes seven justices of the Supreme Court provided for by the state
constitution, see PA. CONST. art. V. § 2; fifteen judges of the Superior Court provided for by the
state's Judicial Code, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 541 (1981); nine judges of the Commonwealth
Court provided for in the Judicial Code, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 561 (1981); and approximately
three hundred and fifty-one court of common pleas judges provided for by the Judicial Code, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (1993 Supp.). The actual number of sitting judges may vary as a result of
vacancies, and the General Assembly may amend the Judicial Code to provide for the addition of
judges as needed. See PA. CONST. art. V. § 4-5.
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constraints is the high cost. In campaign expense reports filed in the
three-month period prior to and immediately after Pennsylvania's May
1993 state Supreme Court primary, the campaign committee of one
primary-winner reported expenditures of $632,465. 93 A loser in the
same primary attributed his loss to a modest fundraising campaign that
raised only about $136,000.9 Similarly, in 1989, the winning candidate
for a Pennsylvania Supreme Court seat spent more than $1.4 million
while the losing candidate raised only a third of that figure. 95 Moreover,
more than half of the campaign funds for the 1989 winning candidate
were contributed by members of the legal profession." With financial
constraints of this dimension, even the most ethical candidate cannot
avoid at least the appearance of having to "curry political favors or raise
money from lawyers or special-interest groups that may come before
them." 97

Opponents" of merit selection generally base their challenge on the

93. Citizens for Judge Nigro, 1993 Campaign Expense Reports (unpublished document on file
with the Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation, Department of State, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania).
94. See Tim Reeves, Nigro Barely Defeated Musmanno, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, May 20,
1993, at Cl.
95. Mark Hansen, The High Cost of Judging, A.B.A. J. 44 (Sept. 1991); Campaign
Contributions 1989 Appellate Court Races, (unpublished document of Common Cause on file with
Common Cause of Pennsylvania) (quoted figures refer to the judicial race between Justice Ralph
Cappy and Judge Anita Brody of Montgomery Court of Common Pleas).
96. Id.
97. See Tim Reeves, Bill Will End Election of Judges, PITrSBURGH POST GAZErTE, June 6,
1993, at B-I (quoting Lynn A. Marks, Esquire, Executive Director of Pennsylvanians for Modem
Courts).
98. Traditional opponents of merit selection include organized labor, the organized plaintiffs'
bar, and the religious right. See, e.g., Merit Selection Is Not What It's Cracked Up To Be, PHILA.
INQUIRER, July 7, 1993, at A-15. (Letter to the editor from John P. Morris, President, Pennsylvania
Conference of Teamsters, opposing merit selection); Russel E. Eshelman, Jr., Senate Panel Favors
Appointing Judges, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 9. 1993, at B-I (comments of lobbyist for Pennsylvania
Trial Lawyer's Association, opposing merit selection); PaTLA Chief To ProtectRights OfConsumers,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1993, at 1 (comments of president of Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers
Association, opposing merit selection); Tom Watson, The Run For The Robes, GOVERNING, July
1991, at 49, 52.
Although minority groups are also often regarded as opponents of merit selection, see Watson,
supra, in Pennsylvania opposition of minority communities is not unanimous. Some spokespeople
for the African-American community have voiced opposition to or reservations about merit selection,
reasoning that elections provide opportunities to diversify the bench, and to advance issues important
to the African-American community. See, e.g., Charles W. Bowser, Black Skin Does Not Mean
Nearly Enough, PHIILA. TRIBUNE, July 27, 1993, at 7-A; Charles W. Bowser, Elite Merit Selection
Committees Are Without Merit, TIMES LEADER, March 7, 1993, at 3-B (urging, inter alia, that
removing the ability of voters to defeat judicial candidates whose records include racial animosity
is a serious setback for African-Americans). See also Lamar Williams, Casey's State of Union
Address and Role of Blacks, NEW PrrrSBURGH COURIER, February 3, 1993, at C-4 (quoting state
representative Vincent Hughes urging "caution in adopting any plan to appoint judges that has the
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"right to vote" issue, arguing that merit selection is an elitist system that
replaces the "politics of the many" with the "politics of the few."'
Electing judges, the theory goes, fosters a kind of judicial accountability
which cannot be duplicated in the merit selection process.'t° The
problem with this argument is that its proponents presuppose that judges
should be accountable to the public, and it fails to define accountability.
If, for example, the term is meant to express the notion that judges should
answer to the public for misconduct, that issue is properly addressed by
the judicial discipline procedures now in place. If, on the other hand,
accountability means that judges should answer to the public for the
content of their judicial decisions, that idea is inconsistent with the theory
of an independent judiciary and, more broadly, our tri-partite scheme of
government. The obligation of legislatures, which are elected and
accountable to the public, is to make laws reflecting the will of the

potential to take away from our community ... the [political] process ... to advance our
issues .... ").
On the other hand, The Philadelphia Barristers' Association, an association of AfricanAmerican judges and attorneys, is on record as supporting merit selection of appellate judges. The
Barristers' Association prefers to continue elections of courts of common pleas judges, on the theory
that there is a greater opportunity to effect diversification of the bench in local elections. See Mark
A. Tarasiewicz, Bar Endorses Legislation But Favors Local Option, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, March
1, 1993, at 1. Note also that the prime sponsor of the merit selection bill in the House was
Representative Dwight Evans, a leader in the African-American community.
In any case, statistics tend to show that diversification of the appellate bench is furthered by
merit selection. Of the fifty African-American judges sitting on the intermediate appellate courts and
courts of last resort in 1991, 34% attained their seats through merit selection, while another 34% had
become judges through other appointive systems. Only 18% had ascended to the bench through the
elective process. See Women and African-American Judges Currently Serving On State Appellate
Courts (July 1991) (unpublished document of the American Judicature Society on file at the
American Judicature Society).
99. William Robbins, Judicial Appointive Plan Polarizes Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
1984 at A-12. Query, however, whether these opponents seek to protect the majority against the
politics of the few. In Texas, the states' largest pro-life organization distributes more than 700,000
voter guides each election year; in 1992, anticipating a Supreme Court reversal of Roe v. Wade, the
group budgeted 50% of its political action budgets to judicial races, aiming to ensure that judges
would be elected who would be ready immediately to apply an 1898 Texas state law outlawing
abortion. The group focused in particular on one supreme court justice as "one person we'd like to
take out," because in his earlier career as a state senator he had demonstrated pro-abortion rights
sentiments. See Gary Taylor, Judge Races Face Abortion Issue, NAT'L L.J., March 2, 1992, at 3.
In Pennsylvania, the National Rifle Association recently endorsed a current candidate for the
supreme court on the word of a political supporter that he was "on the side of gun owners." Thus,
many merit selection opponents appear to be motivated by the belief that the election process affords
them the opportunity to ensure that judges sympathetic to their special interests will ascend to the
bench, a theory that is at odds with majority rights, as well as the notion of an independent judiciary.
Katharine Seelye, Fumo Helps Nigo Win NRA Support, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 21, 1993, at B-1.
100. See, e.g., Stephen L. Wasby, Accountability of Courts, in ACCOUNTABiLITY IN URBAN
SOCIETY: PUBLIC AGENCIES UNDER FIRE (Scott Greer et al. eds., 1968); STUMPF & CULVER, supra
note 9, at 37-38.
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people. The obligation of the judiciary to the public is to interpret and
to apply the law in an unbiased fashion. And that should be its only
obligation. A system of government that fosters judicial independence as
insurance that judges will apply the law cannot also make those judges
accountable to the public will. Finally, if accountability means that
judges should be answerable to the public for their qualifications and
competence, the answer is that, unfortunately, Pennsylvania's judicial
elections simply do not foster that kind of accountability.
As the Beck Commission advised, judicial accountability is fostered
only if the electoral process is meaningful - and judicial elections are
meaningful only when voters actually exercise their right to vote for or
against judicial candidates whose qualifications and character are
known."°1 From this perspective, statistical data flatly discredits the
notion that judicial accountability is fostered by elections. For example,
in 1983, the Pennsylvania Bar Association commissioned a study of
Pennsylvania voters to determine their level of knowledge about state
judicial elections." 2
Of those surveyed, the majority'0 3 of the
respondents professed a familiarity with the functions of the appellate
courts."°4 Upon more specific questioning, however, the survey
produced these alarming statistics:
(a) Approximately 90% of the respondents indicated that they
spent little or no time learning about the background and
qualifications of judicial candidates for Pennsylvania appellate
courts; 0

101.

5

BECK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 149-52.

102. Special Study for the Pennsylvania Bar Association [hereinafter PBA Study] (May 16, 1983)
(unpublished study on file with the Pennsylvania Bar Association, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania).
103. Id. at 6. According to the Study, 64.1% of the respondents professed familiarity with the
functions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 53.4% expressed familiarity with the Superior Court,
and 64.1% expressed familiarity with the Commonwealth Court.
104. PA. CONST. art. V §§ 2-4, and the Judiciary Code, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-764
(1981 & 1993 Supp.), provide for the existence, organization, and jurisdiction of the appellate courts
of the Commonwealth. The Supreme Court is the highest court of the Commonwealth; the
Commonwealth Court is an intermediate appellate court of limited jurisdiction, which primarily hears
appeals from governmental agency actions, but which also has original jurisdiction over most actions
against the Commonwealth. The Superior Court is primarily a court of general appellate jurisdiction.
105. PBA Study, supra note 102, at 7-9. Of those surveyed, 87% responded that they spent little
or no time studying the background and qualifications of the Supreme Court candidates, 92% stated
that they spent little or no time reviewing the background of the Superior Court candidates, and
94.5% stated that they spent little or no time studying the background and qualifications of the
Commonwealth Court candidates.
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(b) Although 11.1% of the respondents indicated that they
could name the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court; only 4.6% of the those 11.1% did so correctly; 1"
(c) 1%of the respondents indicated that they could name the
President Judge of the Superior Court; no one answered
°7
correctly;'
(d) 2.8% of the respondents stated that they could name the
President Judge of the Commonwealth Court; only 1.8% did so
correctly. "0
A more compelling example of an uninformed electorate is difficult to
imagine.
Those few members of the public who do attempt to learn about the
qualifications of judicial candidates are prevented from doing so by the
limitations of political campaigning and the ethical constraints governing
judicial candidates. Political parties are apt to support particular
candidates for reasons unrelated to qualifications, such as party
patronage.' 9 Modem political campaigns, which primarily utilize
slogans and public encounters of brief duration to introduce a candidate
to the public, are not conducive to discovering whether such candidates
possess the unique qualities needed to make a good judge. Moreover,
judicial ethics forbid judicial candidates to make pledges or promises
regarding disputed legal or political issues, 10° so vehicles like public
debate, which might afford opportunities to assess the intellectual abilities
of a candidate, are essentially foreclosed. Voters, therefore, are forced to
make decisions about judicial candidates in an intellectual vacuum. By
vesting responsibility for review of qualifications in a nominating

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.

109.

See, e.g., Katharine Seelye, Nigro Gets Backing To Run For Pa. Court, PHLA. INQUIRER,

March 21, 1993, at B-3 (discussing trading of votes between delegates from Allegheny and
Philadelphia counties for respective favored judicial candidates); Vincent Thompson, Some Black
Ward Leaders Are Backing Nigro Over Smith, PHIILA. TRIBUNE, May 14, 1993, at 1 (discussing
Philadelphia ward leaders' support of candidate because he was a Philadelphia native and the

[challenger] was a relative newcomer to Philadelphia); Dateline, LEGAL INTEL.IGENCER, April 30,
1993, at 7 (senator reportedly sought governor's assistance to pressure challenger to endorsed
candidate in Supreme Court race to withdraw because it would cost party campaign funds that could
be used elsewhere).
110. In Pennsylvania, this ethical constraint is found at Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
PENNSYLVANIA RULES Op COURT (West 1993).
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commission deliberately designed to accomplish the task, merit selection
relieves voters from participating in the frustrating charade of elections
in which little or nothing can be known of the candidates. '"
Finally, the right to vote for judges is not exercised by meaningful
numbers of voters. In the May 18, 1993 primary elections, which
provided voters with the opportunity to choose candidates for open seats
of the Supreme, Superior, and Commonwealth courts, only 18% of all
Pennsylvanians
of voting age (29% of the state's registered voters), cast
t1 2
ballots.
Personal experiences related by elected judges further discredit the
notion that elections foster meaningful judicial accountability. Former
Superior Court President Judge Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr. relates:
When I ran for the Superior Court, I often asked my audience whether
any one knew who I was or anything about the Superior Court.
Except for an occasional lawyer or personal friend, no one did ....
In the end, I was elected by a substantial margin. But that
didn't indicate in the least that ... after three campaigns, the voters

were in a position to decide whether I would be a good judge. If,
right after my election, the voters had been asked who I was, most of
them would not have had the least idea. The Democratic party ran an
effective campaign in having its party workers get my name on

11l. Certain opponents of merit selection admit to the ills of the election process, but advance
the theory that the solution lies in campaign reforms that would regulate campaign contributions and
eliminate the restrictions on campaign speech imposed by Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
See, e.g., Hank GrezIak, Legislation Would Alter Judicial Campaigns,LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July
22, 1993, at 21 (discussing campaign reform legislation). This theory falters on two grounds. First,
it does not address political party control of the election process, and the accompanying political
affiliations on the part of judicial candidates. Second, and more important, the restriction that
prohibits judicial candidates from expressing their views on legal and political issues is critical to the
concept of an independent judiciary. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in a decision
upholding the constitutionality of Canon 7's speech restrictions:
If judicial candidates . . . prejudge cases that later come before them, the concept of
impartial justice becomes a mockery .... [T]he judicial system is based on the concept
of individualized decision on challenged conduct and interpretations of law enacted by the
other branches of government.
The public has the right to expect that ... the law will be applied regardless of the
personal views of the judge. Taking a position in advance of litigation would inhibit the
judge's ability to consider the matter impartially .... [T]he campaign announcement
would leave the impression that, in fact, if not in actuality, the case was prejudged rather
than adjudicated through a proper application of the law to facts impartially determined.
Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 142, 144 (3d Cir. 1991).
112. A.J. Hostetter, Voters Want Someone Else To Pick Judges, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL,
May 20, 1993, at 1.
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sample ballots ... Most important, there was a vigorous mayoralty
race in Philadelphia, which the Democratic candidate won by a large
margin. I was on his sample ballots and so came out of Philadelphia
[with] too much of a lead for my Republican opponent to overcome.
My election no more reflected the popular will than my opponent's
defeat did. We 1 both
were either the victim or the beneficiary of
3
political chance.'

Such ignorance about judicial candidates is no recent phenomenon.
Twelve years ago, former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Bruce
Kauffman observed:
[T]he evidence overwhelmingly suggests that judges are elected in a
climate of nearly total voter ignorance...[T]he outcome of judicial
contests frequently hinges on the results of simultaneous and more
highly publicized gubernatorial or presidential races." 4
Justice Kauffman's wry quotation of another former state supreme court
justice's comments about his election experiences over seventy years ago
would be entertaining were it not so telling of voter apathy toward
judicial elections:

113. Statement of Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr. In Support of Merit Selection of Pennsylvania Appellate
Judges 204 (Feb. 16, 1993) (unpublished statement presented to Senate Judiciary Committee in public
hearings on merit selection on file with Pennsylvania for Modem Courts, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
Former President Judge Spaeth was appointed to the Superior Court to fill a vacancy in January,
1973, and again in December 1973, and ultimately served on the court until his elective term expired
in 1986. At that time, he declined to participate in the retention election process because of his belief
that "the election of judges, in particular of appellate judges, is fundamentally unsound because it is
inconsistent with the creation of an impartial and qualified judiciary." id. at 2.
The fact that Judge Spaeth was widely recognized as an eminently qualified, productive, and
respected judge makes his decision not to seek retention that much more disturbing. As has been
observed, however, the fact that the election process sometimes does produce worthy candidates gives
"little cause to muddle along with so lunatic a procedure..." Bruce W. Kauffman, JudicialSelection
in Pennsylvania: A Proposal27 VILL. L. REV. 1163, 1163-64 (1981-82) (quoting former California
Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor).
114. Id. at 1166-67. Kauffman relates that in the 1981 judicial elections, fewer than forty
percent of registered voters (and an even smaller percentage of eligible voters) exercised their right
to vote. Few voters went to the polls in the 1981 primary election. Kauffman further recounts the
deplorable results of surveys conducted in New York in 1954 and 1966: in 1954, except for one
exceptionally well-known candidate, only four percent of the New York's voters could name a
judicial candidate for whom they had voted, and only one percent could name a candidate for whom
they had not voted; in 1966, only one percent of the voters could name the candidate who had been
chosen Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals by an overwhelming margin. I11 at 1167 & notes 1819. New York wisely abandoned elections and instituted merit selection of appellate judges in 1978.
Since that time, the New York Court of Appeals has become one of the most respected appellate
courts in the country, notwithstanding the recent travails of its former chief justice. Interestingly, that
former chief justice was the only remaining member of the court to have been elected. See Francis
B. Haas, Jr., Deals Mar Court Choices, HARRISBURG PATRIOT NEws, Dec. 15, 1992, at A-Il.
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I was elected in 1916 because Woodrow Wilson kept us out of war.
I was defeated in 1920 because Woodrow Wilson did not keep us out
of war. In both of the elections, no more than five percent of the
voters knew I was on the ticket." 5
Clearly, the threat that judicial elections pose to the existence of an
independent judiciary eclipses the6benefit of any scintilla of accountability
that may be derived therefrom."
In any case, there is a measure of accountability in the merit
selection process. Some accountability to the public is achieved through
retention elections. Even a measure of political accountability is present
through the joint participation of a bi-partisan nominating committee and
the governor. Merit selection wisely limits partisan political pressure
while qualified candidates are sought out and considered, but realistically
allows for some political motivation on the part of the appointing official
in making the ultimate selection." 7 Indeed, judicial reform advocates
recognize that "Politics do play a part [in the merit selection process], but
an appropriate part." 1 8 The fact that a candidate's first exposure to
consideration is before the nominating commission, where decisions are
based on merit, lessens the influence of political factors. At the same
time, the use of fixed, staggered terms for service on the nominating
commission allows the commission to remain independent of political
influence. And ultimately, the governor must make a choice from among
the candidates recommended by the commission. 9 Insuring an
independent judiciary while providing a limited measure of
accountability - these then are the major benefits of merit selection of
judges.
V. Conclusion
Adoption of a system of merit selection such as that proposed in
original Senate Bill 340 and House Bill 2 will result in the selection of

115. Id. at 1167 (quoting Stephen A. Teller, The Selection of Judges: The Faults of the
Pennsylvania Plan, 41 A.B.A. J. 137, 141 (Feb. 1955)) (quoting former Missouri Supreme Court
Justice Fred L. Williams).
116. John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of California Justices: The Campaign, The
Electorate, and the Issue of JudicialAccountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987).
117. See generally, Mark C. Rahdert, Sprague v. Casey and Its Seven Deadly Sins, 62 TEMP. L.
REV. 625, 647, & n.112 (1989); COMMmTTEE OF SEVENTY. supra note 7.
118. Lynn A. Marks, Esquire, Executive Director of Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts,
Testimony Presented to Senate Judiciary Committee Public Hearing on Merit Selection of Judges
(Feb. 16, 1993) (unpublished statement on file with Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania).
119. Id.

PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

the most qualified and competent appellate judges. It will ensure
adequate representation of our diverse population through a carefully
selected nominating commission. It will engender detached and impartial
decision-making by removing the burdens of financial and political
endorsements from the selection process. Finally, it will restore public
trust in those upon whom we rely to apply the rule of law.
At present, partisan judicial elections threaten the cornerstone of our
judicial system: equal justice under the law. We cannot expect truly
independent and qualified judges until we untie the Gordian knot that
binds Pennsylvania's judiciary to these costly and inane elections.

